Video: Russia, Poland and U.S. Strategy

  In the latest installment of the STRATFOR Insights video series, CEO George Friedman analyzes the upcoming summit July 6-8 between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama from a geopolitical perspective.

Likely topics on the agenda include Iran, Afghanistan, U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and Russia’s sphere of influence.

Video used with permission from Reuters.

To view all video analysis, visit www.STRATFOR.com.

The Gazprom Corp has acquired stupendous prestige since founded in 1998, and yet whilst  President Dmitry Medvedev has held a series of consultations with world leaders,  he has only convivially managed to  establish the settling- in of controversy. 

With regard to his government’s nationalization of its gas reserves and agreements to supply both neighbouring and other wider potential trading partners, Medvedev since handed the reigns of power from Vladimir Putin in 2008 has gained a lot of bargaining power.   

As conversations about green agendas become more commonplace, and politicians talk more about the importance of gauranteeing our future energy security, the goings-on at well mediatized international conferences, attended by our delegates proceed from phase to phase until breakthrough are made.

Weblinks:

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x89rt3_spotlightgazprom-direct-speech_news 

http://old.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article8511.shtml

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/gazprom/index.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b05795e-4733-11de-923e-00144feabdc0.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8118721.stm

   
The contributing two paragraphs added to this post have been by me (jotl). But in the main all attribution for this post goes to www.stratfor.com 

EA:The Return of Classical Greek Terrorism – By Fred Burton and Ben West

Greek anti-terrorism police officer Nektarios Savas was shot and killed June 17 while guarding a state witness in an Athens neighborhood.

Savas was parked in an unmarked vehicle outside the residence of Sofia Kyriakidou, the wife and key witness in the trial of Angeletos Kanas, a convicted member of a defunct Greek militant group.

At 6:20 a.m., shortly after sunrise in Athens, Savas had just gotten coffee and was settling in for his shift when two gunmen approached his vehicle and fired 24 rounds into it, hitting him 18 times and wounding him fatally.

The assassins then sped away on motorcycles driven by two other accomplices. Savas was never able to draw his weapon.

Although the witness Savas was protecting was in the house at the time of the shooting, the gunmen do not appear to have made any attempt to harm her.

Two groups claimed responsibility for the murder, “Revolutionary Sect” and “Rebel Sect,” but groups using slight variations of these names have claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks so far this year.

It is very common for militant groups to claim responsibility for attacks using different names to confuse their pursuers. We believe the group behind most of the recent attacks is “Revolutionary Struggle” (EA).

EA (its initials in Greek) is thought to be a spinoff from the Greek terrorist group November 17 (N-17) and has been operational since at least October 2003.

It shares a similar ideology with N-17, which rejected democracy, capitalism and outside influence in Greece — especially from the United States.

EA rejects EU policies in Greece that it claims hurt the working class. EA was very vocal in the run-up to the 2004 Olympics in Athens, carrying out attacks against businesses and the police to protest the high levels of security in the country and the high price tag that came with hosting the games.

The murder of Savas and other recent attacks by EA demonstrate that the group is becoming increasingly brazen and aggressive, and comparisons between EA and N-17 reach beyond ideology.

EA has used tactics and attacked a target set very much like those of N-17.

It is quite possible, then, that we will see EA expand its actions to include attacks similar to those carried out by N-17, which, throughout its long operational history, assassinated not only police officers but also diplomats and industrialists by using small arms at close range.

Terrorism in Greece

Periodic attacks by anarchists and left-wing militant groups in Greece date back to 1975, when the emerging N-17 shot and killed CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in Athens.

In 2009, however, militant attacks have become more frequent and lethal. There have been 16 attacks so far in 2009, compared to 10 in 2008 and 4 in 2007, and Savas was the first casualty linked to EA or similar groups since 2004. He was not the first police officer to have been targeted in recent years.

On Jan. 5, 2009, during protests in Athens following the police shooting of a 15-year-old boy in December 2008, gunmen shot and seriously wounded a policeman standing watch outside the Culture Ministry building (EA claimed responsibility).

Then on February 3, three gunmen on motorcycles fired on and threw grenades at a police station in an Athens suburb (claimed the next day by a group calling itself the “Sect of Revolutionaries”).

And in December 2004, a policeman was shot and killed while guarding a British diplomat by a man believed to be linked to EA.

In its early stages, EA typically avoided lethal attacks. The group would place warning calls before detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) and conduct attacks at night when the chances of collateral damage were lower.

Their attacks were more the acts of vandals than terrorists. However, in recent years EA has increased its level of violence and has staged attacks that are clearly intended to kill.

Due to this escalation, EA has begun to look more like N-17, and its recent attacks appear to be borrowing from N-17’s playbook.

Shared Tactics

N-17 was comprised of a small group of dedicated militants who, over a period of 25 years in the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s, were responsible for assassinating 22 people before being taken down by Greek authorities in June 2002 (the break came when an N-17 member was wounded while attempting to plant an IED).

N-17 targeted Greek political offices, police and military installations and vehicles, tax offices and facilities of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs).

For targeted assassinations, it employed simple attacks with firearms — a single .45-caliber automatic pistol was linked by ballistics to five different attacks over a 20-year period.

But N-17 also used anti-tank rockets (acquired in a raid on an army camp in 1989) and IEDs, which were involved in its attack against the U.S. Embassy in Athens in 1996 and in its 1988 assassination of U.S. Navy Capt. William Nordeen.

But N-17’s most lethal tactic was the small-arms attack against foreign diplomats and Greek businessmen as they were entering or exiting their vehicles or as they were stopped in traffic.

Its first attack, against Welch, the CIA station chief, occurred outside his home as he was coming back from a Christmas party.

In 1983, the head of the U.S. military aid group in Greece, Navy Capt. George Tsantes, was shot and killed while in his vehicle at a traffic light.

Greek industrialist Dimitris Angelopoulos was shot outside his home as he was entering his vehicle in April 1986.

A number of other cases followed the same script, all the way through to 2000, when British defense attache Brig. Stephen Saunders was shot and killed on his morning commute to the British Embassy by two gunmen on a motorcycle, a get-away vehicle that appears to be as popular with EA as it was with N-17.

It is telling that when EA decided to kill officer Savas it opted for the same tactics as its predecessor used: gunmen on motorcycles striking vehicle-borne targets who were following routine schedules.

Such attacks adhere to a tried-and-true formula that, while not as dramatic as IEDs and rocket attacks, is very straightforward and embodies a simple, brutal elegance.

Shared Target Set

EA appears to have adopted N-17’s target set as well as its tactics. EA and related groups routinely target foreign MNC facilities such as car dealerships and banks, along with security installations and political offices (such as those of Greece’s leading party, New Democracy, attacked in July 2007).

But EA also has a taste, as did N-17, for going after foreign diplomatic targets. In January 2007, EA fired an anti-tank rocket at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, damaging an outside wall.

In 2007 and 2008, militants possibly linked to EA detonated a series of improvised incendiary devices made with camping gas canisters under vehicles belonging to Saudi, Turkish, Philippine Italian and Bosnian diplomats.

The attacks typically destroyed the cars but caused no physical harm to anyone.

While targeting parked diplomatic vehicles with improvised incendiary devices at night posed a minimal threat to people, it did demonstrate that the perpetrators possessed skills that could be employed to more lethal effect.

Even low-level attacks like those on the diplomatic cars showed that militants could follow the basic terrorism attack cycle and conduct preoperational surveillance to determine where the cars were parked at night.

Then they were able to plan their attacks, acquire the necessary materials, construct their devices and plant them without detection.

And if an attacker can determine where a diplomat parks his or her car at night and plan an operation around that, it is not a very large leap to shoot a diplomat walking to a car or sitting inside a car in traffic.

Of course, simply identifying a vehicle with diplomatic plates does not automatically mean that the owner is a high-level diplomat.

In order to identify a high-value target (HVT) such as a CIA station chief or military attache, additional intelligence would have to be collected.

To justify its increasing aggressiveness, EA has used accusations of police brutality stemming from the December 2008 shooting of a youth, but another underlying factor that has led to public unrest in Greece is the global economic crisis, which in Europe is widely blamed on foreign companies and governments.

EA and like-minded groups have made it clear that international banks and investment houses are in their crosshairs, as seen in the attempted Feb. 18 IED attack on a Citibank branch in Athens and a successful attack on a Citibank branch the next month.

Just as the attack against the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic vehicles demonstrated that foreign diplomats are in EA’s target set, these bank attacks demonstrate that financial executives also could be targeted.

Protecting Against the Threat

No government has the resources to protect everything, and the Greek government is no exception.

EA has many targets, which means that Athens cannot possibly protect every foreign diplomat, Greek industrialist and foreign businessman in the country. Because of this, individuals in this target set must begin to practice good personal security habits and increased situational awareness.

Special attention should be paid to possible surveillants on motorcycles (especially those wearing helmets that obscure the entire face). N-17 shot several victims from motorcycles as the victims were sitting in their cars in Athens traffic.

 Assailants would pull up from behind the driver’s window and fire from close range. Potential EA targets should pay close attention to motorcycles approaching them from the rear as they are stopped in traffic.

Likewise, companies and governments with people on the ground in Greece should conduct their own proactive security measures to prevent falling victim to an attack.

One of the most obvious measures is to institute a countersurveillance (CS) program, since any attack would be preceded by preoperational surveillance of the target.

Employing a countersurveillance team will help identify potential surveillants around sensitive targets (such as private residences, offices or commonly used routes) and increase the likelihood of thwarting an attack while it is still in the planning stage.

 (Such efforts might also produce information that would help the Greek government identify EA operatives.)

However, even if a CS operation is not successful at identifying specific operatives, it could, at the very least, make it harder for militants to attack a certain target and encourage them to move on to something less challenging.

With attacks escalating in Greece, a militant group apparently taking its cues from N-17, and an economic crisis stirring up social unrest, the level of risk in Greece — especially Athens — is very high.

Practicing appropriate security measures will help ensure the safety of HVTs and prevent them from becoming the next media story.

Postscript for Security Pros

The June 17 Savas killing holds a strong lesson for anyone working alone to protect a potential target.

This is not as uncommon as it might seem: There are many executive protection teams around the world in both government and private industry that rely on a single officer or agent working to keep a principal safe.

And it is not at all uncommon for a lone agent, like Savas, to work long hours posted in front of the principal’s home.

During such an operation, it is extremely difficult to remain alert — especially after standing a post for weeks or months without anything happening.

It becomes a full-time job merely to remain alert during an entire shift and it is very easy for complacency to set in.

This danger is amplified in the age of iPhones, PDAs and laptop computers, devices that make it very easy to become distracted.

But lack of situational awareness can be very deadly, even for trained security personnel.

Weblinks:  http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Greek_extremists_claim_policeman_s__06222009.html

http://www.france24.com/en/20090617-greek-witness-protection-officer-killed-athens-0

http://www.assassinology.org/id23.html

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100002_14/01/2003_25198

http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=Countries&file=index&view=95

 

 

This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com

 

 

The Real Struggle in Iran and Implications for U.S. Dialogue – By George Friedman

Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama said June 26,“We don’t yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran.”

On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions, the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves.

By the conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushing a popular rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has happened in Iran.

In reality, Obama’s point is well taken. This is because the real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever about the liberalization of the regime.

Rather, it has been about the role of the clergy — particularly the old-guard clergy — in Iranian life, and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.

Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people.

He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family.

Indeed, during the demonstrations, Rafsanjani’s daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and then released a day later.

 Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of the regime’s two most powerful institutions — the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader.

Forbes has called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.

Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter’s family’s vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene.

It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it.

Ahmadinejad wants to retain the regime, but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime.

The Iranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current religious leadership.

Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy.

At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage.

The underlying issue was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad’s charges of financial corruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others.

When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger.

The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up.

Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week, Khamenei decided to end the situation.

In essence, he tried to hold things together by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by five days.

The Struggle Within the Regime The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime.

Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution.

The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election.

And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.

The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges — and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting.

The Iranian president’s populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the reason that the media portrayed.

Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in the establishment who clearly sees Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat.

 Ahmadinejad’s ability to survive the unified opposition of the clergy, election or not, is not at all certain.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

But the problem is that there is no unified clergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new political balance while making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated.

Removing “public unrest” (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of both sides may take away one of Rafsanjani’s more effective tools. But ultimately, it actually could benefit him.

Should the internal politics move against the Iranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad — who has a substantial public following — who would not be able to have his supporters take to the streets.

The View From the West The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight?

We would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran’s foreign relations.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This fight simply isn’t about foreign policy. Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad’s radicalism.

Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani’s faction came out on top.

Khamenei has approved Iran’s foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies.

Ahmadinejad’s policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is part of.

It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing. Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that he systematically has accumulated power and wealth.

He seems concerned about the Iranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns a lot of it.

Ahmadinejad’s entire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested in his own economic well-being.

These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani was part of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the political and clerical elite.

It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadership elements have abandoned those principles. When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed.

The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran’s support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage. Tehran’s primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements.

The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran’s reach so that such an attack could be countered. There are U.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic, and the United States has expressed hostility to the regime.

The Iranians are envisioning a worst-case scenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remain true no matter who runs the government.

We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently.

Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran’s ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them.

This gives Tehran a platform for bargaining without triggering Iran’s destruction, a task at which it has proved sure-footed. In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon.

Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible destabilize Iraq — bogging down U.S. forces there — while simultaneously using Hezbollah’s global reach to carry out terror attacks.

After all, Hezbollah is today’s al Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group’s ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, is substantial.

We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West.

Those would have to include guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Obama, of course, has been aware of this bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.

Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN’s coverage of the protests, the Iranians know that the U.S. government doesn’t control CNN’s coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly different view of the BBC.

The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a democratic uprising against a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British state-run media to inflame the situation.

This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame some foreigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain. But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make three points.

First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain.

Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran’s foreign policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight.

The fantasy of a democratic revolution overthrowing the Islamic Republic — and thus solving everyone’s foreign policy problems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse — has passed.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranian foreign affairs, must now define an Iran policy — particularly given Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s meeting in Washington with U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell this Monday.

Obama has said that nothing that has happened in Iran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is easier said than done.

The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now they are joined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as human rights violators.

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear where he thinks he is maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogue if it involves any preconditions.

But given the events of the past weeks, and the perceptions about them that have now been locked into the public mind, Obama isn’t going to be able to make many concessions.

It would appear to us that in this, as in many other things, Obama will be following the Bush strategy — namely, criticizing Iran without actually doing anything about it.

And so he goes to Moscow more aware than ever that Russia could cause the United States a great deal of pain if it proceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a political crisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind.

Weblinks: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE55L0D520090622

This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com

 

Algeria: Taking the Pulse of AQIM – By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton


Late in the evening of June 17, 2009, militants affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a convoy near Bordj Bou Arreridj, Algeria, which is located in a mountainous area east of Algiers that has traditionally been an Islamist militant stronghold.

The convoy consisted of Algerian paramilitary police vehicles escorting a group of Chinese workers to a site where they were building a new highway to connect Bordj Bou Arreridj with Algiers.

After disabling the convoy using IEDs, the militants then raked the trapped vehicles with small-arms fire. When the ambush was over, 18 policemen and one Chinese worker had been killed.

Another six gendarmes and two Chinese workers were wounded in the attack.

It was the deadliest attack of any type in Algeria since an Aug. 19, 2008, suicide vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack against a line of job applicants outside a police academy in Les Issers that killed 48 and injured another 45.

AQIM regularly launches armed ambushes and roadside IED attacks in Algeria, and ambushes were frequently used by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) before it announced in September 2006 that it had become part of al Qaeda’s regional franchise — AQIM.

Indeed, we have seen four other ambush and IED attacks since May 20, 2009, but the death tolls in such attacks have usually been smaller than the June 17 attack.

In light of this anomalous attack, we thought it would be an opportune time to take the pulse of AQIM and try to get a sense of where the group stands today and where it might be going over the next few months.

History and Trends

The GSPC began as a splinter of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998 as the civil war in Algeria was winding down.

At that time, Hassan Hattab led a group of other disaffected GIA members who disagreed with GIA’s targeting of unarmed civilians.

Hattab and his followers wanted to distance themselves from the large-scale massacres that had taken place while continuing their struggle against the Algerian government. They formed the GSPC to give themselves a fresh name and a new start.

Hattab eventually ran into disputes within the GSPC as the group was increasingly drawn to the transnational jihadist campaign espoused by al Qaeda.

He “resigned” (though he was effectively deposed) as the group’s leader in 2001 and was succeeded by Nabil Sahraoui, who declared the GSPC’s allegiance to al Qaeda. Security forces killed Sahraoui in 2004.

In a message issued on Sept. 11, 2006, al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that the GSPC had joined forces with al Qaeda in a union he hoped would be “a thorn in the neck of the American and French Crusaders and their allies, and an arrow in the heart of the traitors and apostates.”

On Sept. 13, GSPC acknowledged the merger on its Web site with a message from its emir, Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, who wrote, “We have full confidence in the faith, the doctrine, the method and the modes of action of [al Qaeda’s] members, as well as their leaders and religious guides.”

The newly-established al Qaeda franchise in Algeria was not idle for long. On Oct. 19, 2006, it conducted two IED attacks, one against a police station in El Harrach, an eastern suburb of Algiers, the second against a fuel storage site belonging to the French company Razel in Lakhdaria.

On Oct. 29, 2006, the group conducted near-simultaneous VBIED attacks against two Algerian police stations in Reghaia and Dergana.

While simultaneous VBIED attacks were something seen in al Qaeda operations, these attacks involved vehicles parked near their targets rather than suicide vehicles and, as such, resembled past GSPC attacks, as did the selection of police stations as targets.

Because of these features, the attacks were seen as examples of a hybrid, or transitional, kind of attack.

Other transitional attacks continued into early 2007, such as the twin attacks on March 5, 2007, which targeted foreign oil workers and Algerian security forces, indicating AQIM was incorporating the security-force targets of the GSPC with the foreign-influence targets of al Qaeda.

The focus on foreign interests and the energy sector was seen in several other attacks and attempted attacks against foreign oil workers and pipelines in late 2006 and early 2007.

In spite of this focus, to date, AQIM has not been able to launch any truly disruptive attacks against the Algerian energy sector.

On April 11, 2007, AQIM passed another threshold when the group employed two suicide VBIEDS in attacks against separate targets in Algiers.

One device was directed at the prime minister’s office in the city center and the second targeted a police station near the international airport in the eastern part of the city.

At least 33 people reportedly were killed in the blasts and more than 150 wounded. These attacks marked the first suicide attacks in Algeria connected with GSPC or AQIM and signified a change in tactics.

However, the group’s increased operational tempo and less discriminate target selection came with consequences.

In mid-2007 the Algerian government launched a massive operation against AQIM that resulted in large losses of men and materiel for the group.

AQIM’s shift in targeting strategy also caused disagreements within the insurgency’s leadership.

The schism arose between members who favored the tradition GSPC target set and opposed killing civilians, and those members who were more heavily influenced by al Qaeda and wanted to hit foreign and symbolic targets with little regard for civilian casualties.

In spite of the government crackdown, and in the face of growing internal dissent, AQIM accelerated its suicide bombing campaign, and there were several other suicide attacks during the last three months of 2007.

These attacks included the Sept. 6 bombing of a crowd waiting to greet Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika in Batna that killed 22 people and injured more than a hundred. 

A Sept. 8 suicide VBIED attack against a naval barracks in Dellys that killed 30; and twin suicide VBIED attacks on Dec. 11 that targeted the constitutional court and the headquarters of the U.N. refugee agency in Algiers that killed 47 people, including 17 U.N. employees.

AQIM conducted six suicide bombing attacks against military and police targets between January 2008 and the Aug. 19, 2008, VBIED attack against the police academy in Les Issers.

During this time, military and law enforcement pressure by the Algerian government continued, as did the public criticism of AQIM for killing innocents.

The criticism reached a crescendo after the Les Issers attack, which killed largely poor people looking for employment with the police.

AQIM has only conducted one suicide attack since August 2008, and the bulk of its operations have been in sparsely populated areas instead of cities.

It is unclear at this point whether these observable shifts are in response to the criticism of AQIM’s tactics or if they are a result of the government’s efforts to dismantle the group.

Large VBIEDs are resource intensive. In fact, the explosives required to construct one large VBIED could be used to manufacture many smaller IEDs or suicide vests.

Since the Les Issers attack, AQIM has conducted several IED attacks but these have all involved smaller IEDs, and the number of bystander deaths has dropped as the attacks have appeared to have been more carefully aimed at government or foreign targets.

Of course, suicide bombers are also a resource that can only be used once, and it takes time and effort to recruit new bombers.

We will be watching carefully to see if the current trend away from the employment of large VBIEDs in urban areas is a temporary lull caused by government pressure and a lack of resources, or if it is an intentional shift designed to assuage public anger.

It is very difficult for an insurgent organization to thrive in an environment where the local population turns against it, and perhaps the AQIM leadership has learned a lesson from the high cost the GIA paid after it began killing civilians and lost public support.

In addition to the military and law enforcement pressure, the Algerian government has been very busy in its efforts to apply ideological pressure to AQIM.

One way this pressure has been applied is in the form of former militant leaders associated with the group criticizing its change in targeting and tactics.

For example, after the Les Issers bombing in August 2008, GSPC founder Hassan Hattab called on the militants to lay down their arms and surrender.

There is also talk that the government may soon expand an amnesty offer to include members of the organization who have been excluded from the current amnesty offer because they were deemed to have too much blood on their hands.

Like previous amnesty offers, this expansion could serve to further weaken the organization as members choose to turn themselves in.

Regional Franchise?

By design, AQIM incorporated the GSPC with elements of Morocco’s Islamic Combatant Group, Libya’s Islamic Fighting Group, several Tunisian groups, most notably the Tunisian Combatant Group, and jihadists in Mali, Niger and Mauritania.

However, in practice, the vast majority of the group’s infrastructure came from the GSPC, and attacks since the founding of AQIM in 2006 have reflected this.

Indeed, in spite of the many high-profile Libyan and Moroccan militants who serve as part of the al Qaeda core leadership, Libya and Morocco have been extremely calm since the emergence of AQIM, and the group has remained an Algeria-based phenomenon.

In Mauritania, attacks linked to AQIM began as early as December 2007, but AQIM militants there have not displayed the capability to carry out sophisticated attacks.

Most attacks in Mauritania involve amateurish small-arms assaults such as the attack on French tourists on Dec. 23, 2007, or the Feb. 1, 2008, shooting at the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital.

As we were writing this, we learned of the June 23 shooting of an American teacher in Nouakchott.

The man was reportedly gunned down outside the school where he taught, and Mauritanian officials are blaming the attack on AQIM rather than criminals.

The attacks in Mauritania have shown rudimentary tactics with poor planning, and the militants associated with AQIM in Mauritania simply have not displayed the ability to mount a large-scale, coordinated attack.

The group’s activities in Mali and Niger are also mainly constrained to low-level attacks against government or military outposts and foreign mining sites and personnel in the northern stretches of those countries.

AQIM also conducts training and engages in smuggling and kidnappings for ransom in this deserted region.

This means that, in the end, in spite of all the hype associated with the AQIM name, the group is essentially a rebranded GSPC and not some sort of revolutionary new organization.

It has adapted its target set to include foreign interests, and it did add suicide bombing to its repertoire, but aside from that there has been very little movement toward AQIM’s becoming a truly regional threat.

That said, AQIM has received a lot of attention from the al Qaeda core leadership, which has sought to support it however it can and spur it on beyond Algeria.

On June 23, 2009, al Qaeda media wing As Sahab released a 35-minute video statement from Abu Yahya al-Libi entitled “Algeria Between the Sacrifice of Fathers and Faithfulness of Sons.”

As his name implies, al-Libi is himself from Libya, and one of the things he does in the video is urge militants in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco to mobilize and join under the “banner, command and emirate” of AQIM.

The video appears to be an attempt by the al Qaeda leadership to counter ideological attacks by the Algerian government as well as AQIM’s regional stagnation.

Coming Home to Roost?

In addition to fighting against the regime in Algeria, Algerian militants have also been very conspicuous on jihadist battlefields such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Some studies have even concluded that Algerians were the single largest group of foreign jihadists who fought in Iraq during the height of the insurgency.

One of the things we have been anticipating for several years now is a boomerang effect as foreign jihadists leave places such as Iraq and Pakistan and return home.

While many foreign jihadists have been killed in such places, those who survive after fighting sophisticated foes like the American military are not only hardened but also possess insurgent tradecraft skills that make them far more lethal when they leave those battlefields than when they entered them.

Indeed, we have seen a migration of IED technology and tactics from Iraq to other theaters, such as Afghanistan.

With developments in Iraq over the last few years that have made Iraq increasingly inhospitable to foreign jihadists, and with Pakistan now quickly becoming less friendly, many of the Algerian militants in those places may be seeking to return home. And this brings us back to the anomalous vehicular ambush on June 17.

That operation, while a common type of attack in Algeria, was uncharacteristically deadly.

It is plainly possible that the high death toll was merely a fluke. Perhaps the AQIM militants got lucky or the Algerian gendarmes targeted in the attack made a fatal mistake.

However, the increased death toll could also have been a result of superior IED design, or superior planning by the operational leader of the ambush.

Such a shift could indicate that an experienced operational commander or bombmaker has come to AQIM from someplace like Iraq or Pakistan.

It will be very important to watch the next few AQIM attacks to see if the June 17 attack was indeed just an anomaly or if it was the beginning of a new and deadly trend.

Weblinks:  http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_maghreb.asp

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-vehicle.htm

http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=566

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1360247/Abdul-Rashid-Ghazi

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6288704.stm

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892254,00.html

 

This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com

The Implosion and Death of Jacko.

Since the death of Michael Jackson on Thursday, the media and genuine admirers of him have alternately reflected not only on the life, meteoritcic rise and achievements of this music artist, but also upon his personal character which many perceived to be extraordinarily sycophantic.   

Asking for the cameras to stay away at this time of great privacy, the Jackson Family will probably seek a definite seal of annulment over what remains unresolved in view of the complexity of his legal affairs.  

In a giant league of its own, the fantastically burlesque and ornate Neverland Ranch must seem like an eerily quiet place right now.  

Edifying in every way the grandeur of his imagination and the extremes of his mannerisms, the architectual design of this gated home has never been so thoroughly embellished in the unreal.   

With very little prospect of anyone suffering pecuniary losses after the sale of this property, the future of the most famous of all his capital assets (the Neverland Ranch) will finally be decided upon.

Cardiologist Conrad Murray, a personal physician to Michael Jackson was with him when the star first took ill and fell unconscious at his home in Los Angeles.

Initially, it was Dr Conrad Murray who attempted to resuscitate the celebrity, and yet quite evidently an ambulance was later called for in an emergency.  Dr Murray also accompanied Michael Jackson during his transfer to hospital.

Los Angeles Police Department have interviewed Dr Murray twice.  This is not being treated as a criminal investigation, and Dr Murray has spoken about his involvement in the incident and been co-operative throughout.  

Weblinks:

http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Showbiz-News/Michael-Jackson-Family-Seeks-Second-Post-Mortem-Mystery-Remains-Over-Pop-Singers-Death/Article/200906415321366

http://www.aceshowbiz.com/news/view/00025295.html

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/25/entertainment/main5114139.shtml

http://www.cbs8.com/Global/category.asp?C=170238

http://www.ecorazzi.com/2009/06/26/what-will-happen-to-michael-jacksons-neverland-ranch/

Ali Khamenei indicts Britain.

 

Who knows what I am, Neither a believer in the mosque, Nor an unbeliever worshipping clay, Neither Moses nor the Pharaoh, Neither sinner nor saint; Who know what I am….

Quote by: Seventeenth century poet Bulleh Shah

Weblinks: http://www.apnaorg.com/poetry/bullahn/

Iranian Film-making & culture: http://www.linktv.org/bridgetoiran

 

The giving of a speech last week by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may have helped to create political ructions between Iran and the UK, after both countries expelled two foreign diplomats from their capital cities.   

From what are only politically discursive sets of action,  Ahmadinejad and Brown pay little attention to each other’s repose.   

Much of what Ayatollah Khamenei said in the context of his speech about the UK was delivered in a very acerbic tone. 

Standing before a massive crowd of Iranian citizens and with the watchful eye of every global media agency, Khamenei’s voice wired through digital wave-lengths. TV stations in turn were probably basking well comparatively in strong block audience figures.  

The BBC’s new Persian broadcasting service from Bush House, London, has also had corroborative allegations levelled at it.

Insinuated into this whole row, BBC Persian news schedules are supposedly carrying stories which veer to closely towards providing political support for Western ideals.

Although the gist of Ayatollah Khamenei’s tirade was so anti Anglo-Liberal and contemptuous against the West, we can fairly say for certain that most excerpts of his address were about the declaration of the election result and the student protests. 

Besides, while his remarks about the UK were clearly designed to offend, the references made were peppered throughout the length of the entire oration.

For further reading:

http://www.linktv.org/video/4044/voice-of-iran

http://www.prisonplanet.com/iranian-interior-minister-western-intelligence-behind-riots-and-unrest.html

http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20090624/iran-accuses-us-spy-agency-funding-quot-rioters-quot.htm

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/06/24/76891.html

http://www.aaj.tv/news/World/139728_detail.html

The Iranian Election and the Revolution Test – By George Friedman

    Successful revolutions have three phases. First, a strategically located single or limited segment of society begins vocally to express resentment, asserting itself in the streets of a major city, usually the capital.

    This segment is joined by other segments in the city and by segments elsewhere as the demonstration spreads to other cities and becomes more assertive, disruptive and potentially violent.

    As resistance to the regime spreads, the regime deploys its military and security forces. These forces, drawn from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn on the regime, and stop following the regime’s orders.

    This is what happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia in 1917 or in Romania in 1989.

    Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated.

    When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces — who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the demonstrators — and use force to suppress the rising to the extent necessary.

    This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The students who rose up were not joined by others.

    Military forces who were not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, and the students were crushed.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    • A Question of Support

    This is also what happened in Iran this week. The global media, obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators — who were supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents — failed to notice that while large, the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of people demonstrating.

    Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other classes and to other areas.

    In constantly interviewing English-speaking demonstrators, they failed to note just how many of the demonstrators spoke English and had smartphones.

    The media thus did not recognize these as the signs of a failing revolution.

    Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops — definitely not drawn from what we might call the “Twittering classes,” would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons.

    The troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc.

    Failing to understand the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising.

    But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 — it was Tiananmen Square.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of confusion about basic facts.

    For example, it is said that the urban-rural distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized.

    This is an important point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators representative of the country.

    The problem is the Iranian definition of urban — and this is quite common around the world — includes very small communities (some with only a few thousand people) as “urban.”

    But the social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York.

    We can assure you that that difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same way.

    The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led observers to assume that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country.

    Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to about 13 million people out of Iran’s total population of 70.5 million.

    Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities.

    There are six cities with populations between 1 million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000.

    Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than 1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000.

    Iran has 80 cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than 100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with 100,000 and 5 million are tenuous.

    And with metro Oklahoma City having more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many faces.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    • Winning the Election With or Without Fraud

    We continue to believe two things: that vote fraud occurred, and that Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. Very little direct evidence has emerged to establish vote fraud, but several things seem suspect.

    For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast.

    The polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line.

    By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission declared Ahmadinejad the winner.

    The vote count thus took about seven hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members or school board members being counted — just the presidential race.)

    Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time in their allegations.

    The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on.

    That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour.

    With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else.

    The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same time in all regions.

    We would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other out — explaining why voting percentages didn’t change much during the night.

    It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn’t even carry their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn’t carry Tennessee in 2000.

    We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn’t carry his home precinct in part because people didn’t want to spend their vote on someone unlikely to win — an effect probably felt by the two smaller candidates in the Iranian election.

    That Mousavi didn’t carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some interesting points on this.

    As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province.

    But they also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple campaign appearances in the district.

    They also point out that Khamenei is Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, but by no means was a smoking gun.

    We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, 99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly secular area home to the shah’s family.

    Ahmadinejad carried the province by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years ago.

    But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them together, it would not have changed the outcome.

    The fact is that Ahmadinejad’s vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage in 2005.

    And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad’s performance in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat; many Iranians who viewed those debates — including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters — acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.

    Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet to be rebutted.

    But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him.

    Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn’t, they assumed they were robbed and took to the streets.

    But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen.

    In a complete hijacking of the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi’s supporters joined by others who had been disenfranchised.

     Last Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of Mousavi voters should have made their appearance.

    They didn’t. We might assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage.

    While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small fraction of society.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    • Tensions Among the Political Elite

    All of this not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite.

     That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics.

    But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it.

    Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take.

    Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues.

    The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday.

    He could demand a major recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened.

    Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces.

    Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a way to do it.

    But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied.

    Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.

    The Western media misunderstood this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them , that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus.

    The reason Western media missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite.

    The Western media simply didn’t understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite.

    Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.

    Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process.

     And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses.

    And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic.

    This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however.

    Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth.

    Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced.

    Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.

    Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite.

    Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position.

    There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite.

    Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight — but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle.

    Weblinks:

    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124573726722340719.html

    http://www.aaj.tv/news/World/139639_detail.html

    http://www.aaj.tv/news/World/139417_detail.html

     

    This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

    Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com

     

    Minaret Moments: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday Oration.

    Don’t listen to those who speak of democracy. They all are against Islam. They want to take the nation away from its mission. Break the poisonous pens of all those who speak of nationalism, democracy, and such things.”

    - Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
    Qom, 13 March, 1979
     

    Simple calls to pray in the Islamic world never usually grab the sort of international publicity that this past Friday’s call did. 

    From a large-scale minaret erected at Tehran University,  Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a speech which managed to raise the eye-brows of both Mr David Miliband (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) and the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown.  

    The Iranian Ambassador to the UK, Rasul Movaheddian who was thereby later summoned by the Foreign Ministry and Downing Street had to obiviously provide an explanation for exactly why Khamenei slandered the UK in this post-electoral national address.

    Ayatollah Khamenei spoke of at some level about the UK Government providing glib interference into Iranian affairs.  Warning that further civil demonstrations for the presidential challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi would not be tolerated, whilst also stating that no official recount of the ballot would be considered. 

    Speaking in defence of the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, I believe  Ayatollah Khamenei showed his personal consternation with regard to how the BBC  and other Western media outlets.  

    Natually latching onto reporting about what support and favour Hossein Mousavi had won among important political ranks within Iran, the BBC from Khamenei’s point of view were complicit in helping the protesters to operate step-changes in expressing their dissent. 

    Welinks:

    http://www.geo.tv/6-21-2009/44583.htm

     http://www.presstv.ir/detail/98446.htm?sectionid=351020101

    http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,527022,00.html

    http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=90723&language=en

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2009/06_june/19/persian.shtml

    http://www.illawarramercury.com.au/news/local/news/general/iranian-uow-students-rely-on-twitter-for-news-back-home/1545749.aspx

    http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/san_francisco&id=6866895

    http://www.linktv.org/

    Security at Places of Worship: More Than a Matter of Faith -By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton.

    In recent months, several high-profile incidents have raised awareness of the threat posed by individuals and small groups operating under the principles of leaderless resistance.

    These incidents have included lone wolf attacks against a doctor who performed abortions in Kansas, an armed forces recruitment center in Arkansas and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.

    Additionally, a grassroots jihadist cell was arrested for attempting to bomb Jewish targets in the Bronx and planning to shoot down a military aircraft at an Air National Guard base in Newburgh, N.Y.

    In addition to pointing out the threat posed by grassroots cells and lone wolf operatives, another common factor in all of these incidents is the threat of violence to houses of worship.

    The cell arrested in New York left what they thought to be active improvised explosive devices outside the Riverdale Temple and the Riverdale Jewish Community Center.

    Dr. George Tiller was shot and killed in the lobby of the Reformation Lutheran Church in Wichita.

    Although Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad conducted his attacks against a Little Rock recruiting center, he had conducted preoperational surveillance and research on targets that included Jewish organizations and a Baptist church in places as far away as Atlanta and Philadelphia.

    And while James von Brunn attacked the Holocaust Museum, he had a list of other potential targets in his vehicle that included the National Cathedral.

    In light of this common thread, it might be instructive to take a more detailed look at the issue of providing security for places of worship.

    • Awareness: The First Step

    Until there is awareness of the threat, little can be done to counter it. In many parts of the world, such as Iraq, India and Pakistan, attacks against places of worship occur fairly frequently.

    It is not difficult for religious leaders and members of their congregations in such places to be acutely aware of the dangers facing them and to have measures already in place to deal with those perils.

    This is not always the case in the United States, however, where many people tend to have an “it can’t happen here” mindset, believing that violence in or directed against places of worship is something that happens only to other people elsewhere.

    This mindset is particularly pervasive among predominantly white American Protestant and Roman Catholic congregations.

    Jews, Mormons, Muslims and black Christians, and others who have been targeted by violence in the past, tend to be far more aware of the threat and are far more likely to have security plans and measures in place to counter it.

    The Jewish community has very well-developed and professional organizations such as the Secure Community Network (SCN) and the Anti-Defamation League that are dedicated to monitoring threats and providing education about the threats and advice regarding security.

    The Council on American-Islamic Relations has taken on a similar role for the Muslim community and has produced a “Muslim community safety kit” for local mosques.

    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) also has a very organized and well-connected security department that provides information and security advice and assistance to LDS congregations worldwide.

    There are no functional equivalents to the SCN or the LDS security departments in the larger Catholic, evangelical Protestant and mainline Protestant communities, though there are some organizations such as the recently established Christian Security Network that have been attempting to fill the void.

    Following an incident, awareness of the threat seems to rise for a time, and some houses of worship will put some security measures in place, but for the most part such incidents are seen as events that take place elsewhere, and the security measures are abandoned after a short time.

    Permanent security measures are usually not put in place until there has been an incident of some sort at a specific house of worship, and while the triggering incident is sometimes something that merely provides a good scare, other times it is a violent action that results in tragedy.

    Even when no one is hurt in the incident, the emotional damage caused to a community by an act of vandalism or arson at a house of worship can be devastating.

    It is important to note here that not all threats to places of worship will emanate from external actors.

    In the midst of any given religious congregation, there are, by percentages, people suffering from serious mental illnesses, people engaged in bitter child-custody disputes, domestic violence situations and messy divorces.

    Internal disputes in the congregation can also lead to feuds and violence.

    Any of these situations can (and have) led to acts of violence inside houses of worship.

    • Security Means More than Alarms and Locks

    An effective security program is more than just having physical security measures in place. Like any man-made constructs, physical security measures — closed-circuit television (CCTV), alarms, cipher locks and so forth — have finite utility.

    They serve a valuable purpose in institutional security programs, but an effective security program cannot be limited to these things. Devices cannot think or evaluate.

    They are static and can be observed, learned and even fooled. Also, because some systems frequently produce false alarms, warnings in real danger situations may be brushed aside.

    Given these shortcomings, it is quite possible for anyone planning an act of violence to map out, quantify and then defeat or bypass physical security devices. However, elaborate planning is not always necessary.

    Consider the common scenario of a heavy metal door with very good locks that is propped open with a trashcan or a door wedge.

    In such a scenario, an otherwise “secure” door is defeated by an internal security lapse.

    However, even in situations where there is a high degree of threat awareness, there is a tendency to place too much trust in physical security measures, which can become a kind of crutch — and, ironically, an obstacle to effective security.

    In fact, to be effective, physical security devices always require human interaction.

    An alarm is useless if no one responds to it, or if it is not turned on; a lock is ineffective if it is not engaged.

    CCTV cameras are used extensively in corporate office buildings and some houses of worship, but any competent security manager will tell you that, in reality, they are far more useful in terms of investigating a theft or act of violence after the fact than in preventing one (although physical security devices can sometimes cause an attacker to divert to an easier target).

    No matter what kinds of physical security measures may be in place at a facility, they are far less likely to be effective if a potential assailant feels free to conduct preoperational surveillance, and is free to observe and map those physical security measures.

    The more at ease someone feels as they set about identifying and quantifying the physical security systems and procedures in place, the higher the odds they will find ways to beat the system.

    A truly “hard” target is one that couples physical security measures with an aggressive, alert attitude and sense of awareness.

    An effective security program is proactive — looking outward to where most real threats are lurking — rather than inward, where the only choice is to react once an attack has begun to unfold.

    We refer to this process of proactively looking for threats as protective intelligence.

    The human interaction required to make physical security measures effective, and to transform a security program into a proactive protective intelligence program, can come in the form of designated security personnel.

    In fact, many large houses of worship do utilize off-duty police officers, private security guards, volunteer security guards or even a dedicated security staff to provide this coverage.

    In smaller congregations, security personnel can be members of the congregation who have been provided some level of training.

    However, even in cases where there are specially designated security personnel, such officers have only so many eyes and can only be in a limited number of places at any one time.

    Thus, proactive security programs should also work to foster a broad sense of security awareness among the members of the congregation and community, and use them as additional resources.

    Unfortunately, in many cases, there is often a sense in the religious community that security is bad for the image of a particular institution, or that it will somehow scare people away from houses of worship.

    Because of this, security measures, if employed, are often hidden or concealed from the congregation.

    In such cases, security managers are deprived of many sets of eyes and ears.

    Certainly, there may be certain facets of a security plan that not everyone in the congregation needs to know about, but in general, an educated and aware congregation and community can be a very valuable security asset.

    • Training

    In order for a congregation to maintain a sense of heightened awareness it must learn how to effectively do that. This training should not leave people scared or paranoid — just more observant.

    People need to be trained to look for individuals who are out of place, which can be somewhat counterintuitive. By nature, houses of worship are open to outsiders and seek to welcome strangers.

    They frequently have a steady turnover of new faces. This causes many to believe that, in houses of worship, there is a natural antagonism between security and openness, but this does not have to be the case.

    A house of worship can have both a steady stream of visitors and good security, especially if that security is based upon situational awareness.

    At its heart, situational awareness is about studying people, and such scrutiny will allow an observer to pick up on demeanor mistakes that might indicate someone is conducting surveillance.

    Practicing awareness and paying attention to the people approaching or inside a house of worship can also open up a whole new world of ministry opportunities, as people “tune in” to others and begin to perceive things they would otherwise miss if they were self-absorbed or simply not paying attention.

    In other words, practicing situational awareness provides an excellent opportunity for the members of a congregation to focus on the needs and burdens of other people.

    It is important to remember that every attack cycle follows the same general steps. All criminals — whether they are stalkers, thieves, lone wolves or terrorist groups — engage in preoperational surveillance (sometimes called “casing,” in the criminal lexicon).

    Perhaps the most crucial point to be made about preoperational surveillance is that it is the phase when someone with hostile intentions is most apt to be detected — and the point in the attack cycle when potential violence can be most easily disrupted or prevented.

    The second most critical point to emphasize about surveillance is that most criminals are not that good at it.

    They often have terrible surveillance tradecraft and are frequently very obvious.

    Most often, the only reason they succeed in conducting surveillance without being detected is because nobody is looking for them. Because of this, even ordinary people, if properly instructed, can note surveillance activity.

    It is also critically important to teach people — including security personnel and members of the congregation — what to do if they see something suspicious and whom to call to report it.

    Unfortunately, a lot of critical intelligence is missed because it is not reported in a timely manner — or not reported at all — mainly because untrained people have a habit of not trusting their judgment and dismissing unusual activity.

    People need to be encouraged to report what they see.

    Additionally, people who have been threatened, are undergoing nasty child-custody disputes or have active restraining orders protecting them against potentially violent people need to be encouraged to report unusual activity to their appropriate points of contact.

    As a part of their security training, houses of worship should also instruct their staff and congregation members on procedures to follow if a shooter enters the building and creates what is called an active-shooter situation.

    These “shooter” drills should be practiced regularly — just like fire, tornado or earthquake drills. The teachers of children’s classes and nursery workers must also be trained in how to react.

    • Liaison

    One of the things the SCN and ADL do very well is foster security liaison among Jewish congregations within a community and between those congregations and local, state and federal law enforcement organizations.

    This is something that houses of worship from other faiths should attempt to duplicate as part of their security plans. While having a local cop in a congregation is a benefit, contacting the local police department should be the first step.

    It is very important to establish this contact before there is a crisis in order to help expedite any law enforcement response.

    Some police departments even have dedicated community liaison officers, who are good points of initial contact.

    There are other specific points of contact that should also be cultivated within the local department, such as the SWAT team and the bomb squad.

    Local SWAT teams often appreciate the chance to do a walk-through of a house of worship so that they can learn the layout of the building in case they are ever called to respond to an emergency there.

    They also like the opportunity to use different and challenging buildings for training exercises (something that can be conducted discreetly after hours).

    Congregations with gyms and weight rooms will often open them up for local police officers to exercise in, and some congregations will also offer police officers a cup of coffee and a desk where they can sit and type their reports during evening hours.

    But the local police department is not the only agency with which liaison should be established.

    Depending on the location of the house of worship, the state police, state intelligence fusion center or local joint terrorism task force should also be contacted.

    By working through state and federal channels, houses of worship in specific locations may even be eligible for grants to help underwrite security through programs such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative Nonprofit Security Grant Program.

    The world is a dangerous place and attacks against houses of worship will continue to occur.

    But there are proactive security measures that can be taken to identify attackers before they strike and help prevent attacks from happening or mitigate their effects when they do.

    Some weblinks to the background of hate crimes and attacks on religious places: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/reports.aspx?s=ukraine&p=worship

    http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/reports.aspx?s=usa&p=violence-based-on-religious-bias

    This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

    Attribution for article goes to www.stratfor.com

     

    Western Misconceptions Meet Iranian Reality – By George Friedman

    In 1979, when we were still young and starry-eyed, a revolution took place in Iran. When I asked experts what would happen, they divided into two camps.

    The first group of Iran experts argued that the Shah of Iran would certainly survive, that the unrest was simply a cyclical event readily manageable by his security, and that the Iranian people were united behind the Iranian monarch’s modernization program.

    These experts developed this view by talking to the same Iranian officials and businessmen they had been talking to for years — Iranians who had grown wealthy and powerful under the shah and who spoke English, since Iran experts frequently didn’t speak Farsi all that well.

    The second group of Iran experts regarded the shah as a repressive brute, and saw the revolution as aimed at liberalizing the country.

    Their sources were the professionals and academics who supported the uprising — Iranians who knew what former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini believed, but didn’t think he had much popular support.

    They thought the revolution would result in an increase in human rights and liberty. The experts in this group spoke even less Farsi than the those in the first group.

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    Misreading Sentiment in Iran

    Limited to information on Iran from English-speaking opponents of the regime, both groups of Iran experts got a very misleading vision of where the revolution was heading — because the Iranian revolution was not brought about by the people who spoke English.

    It was made by merchants in city bazaars, by rural peasants, by the clergy — people Americans didn’t speak to because they couldn’t. This demographic was unsure of the virtues of modernization and not at all clear on the virtues of liberalism.

    From the time they were born, its members knew the virtue of Islam, and that the Iranian state must be an Islamic state.

    Americans and Europeans have been misreading Iran for 30 years. Even after the shah fell, the myth has survived that a mass movement of people exists demanding liberalization — a movement that if encouraged by the West eventually would form a majority and rule the country.

    We call this outlook “iPod liberalism,” the idea that anyone who listens to rock ‘n’ roll on an iPod, writes blogs and knows what it means to Twitter must be an enthusiastic supporter of Western liberalism.

    Even more significantly, this outlook fails to recognize that iPod owners represent a small minority in Iran — a country that is poor, pious and content on the whole with the revolution forged 30 years ago.

    There are undoubtedly people who want to liberalize the Iranian regime. They are to be found among the professional classes in Tehran, as well as among students.

    Many speak English, making them accessible to the touring journalists, diplomats and intelligence people who pass through.

    They are the ones who can speak to Westerners, and they are the ones willing to speak to Westerners.  And these people give Westerners a wildly distorted view of Iran.

    They can create the impression that a fantastic liberalization is at hand — but not when you realize that iPod-owning Anglophones are not exactly the majority in Iran.

    Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about two-thirds of the vote.

    Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad.

    It is, of course, interesting to meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial.

    A poll therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and other urban areas.

    Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside Tehran, and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.

    Some still charge that Ahmadinejad cheated. That is certainly a possibility, but it is difficult to see how he could have stolen the election by such a large margin.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    Doing so would have required the involvement of an incredible number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly did not jibe with sentiment in each precinct.

    Widespread fraud would mean that Ahmadinejad manufactured numbers in Tehran without any regard for the vote.

    But he has many powerful enemies who would quickly have spotted this and would have called him on it.

    Mousavi still insists he was robbed, and we must remain open to the possibility that he was, although it is hard to see the mechanics of this.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    Ahmadinejad’s Popularity

    It also misses a crucial point: Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread popularity. He doesn’t speak to the issues that matter to the urban professionals, namely, the economy and liberalization.

    But Ahmadinejad speaks to three fundamental issues that accord with the rest of the country.

    First, Ahmadinejad speaks of piety. Among vast swathes of Iranian society, the willingness to speak unaffectedly about religion is crucial.

    Though it may be difficult for Americans and Europeans to believe, there are people in the world to whom economic progress is not of the essence; people who want to maintain their communities as they are and live the way their grandparents lived.

    These are people who see modernization — whether from the shah or Mousavi — as unattractive. They forgive Ahmadinejad his economic failures.

    Second, Ahmadinejad speaks of corruption. There is a sense in the countryside that the ayatollahs — who enjoy enormous wealth and power, and often have lifestyles that reflect this — have corrupted the Islamic Revolution.

    Ahmadinejad is disliked by many of the religious elite precisely because he has systematically raised the corruption issue, which resonates in the countryside.

    Third, Ahmadinejad is a spokesman for Iranian national security, a tremendously popular stance.

    It must always be remembered that Iran fought a war with Iraq in the 1980s that lasted eight years, cost untold lives and suffering, and effectively ended in its defeat. Iranians, particularly the poor, experienced this war on an intimate level.

    They fought in the war, and lost husbands and sons in it. As in other countries, memories of a lost war don’t necessarily delegitimize the regime.

    Rather, they can generate hopes for a resurgent Iran, thus validating the sacrifices made in that war — something Ahmadinejad taps into.

    By arguing that Iran should not back down but become a major power, he speaks to the veterans and their families, who want something positive to emerge from all their sacrifices in the war.

    Perhaps the greatest factor in Ahmadinejad’s favor is that Mousavi spoke for the better districts of Tehran — something akin to running a U.S. presidential election as a spokesman for Georgetown and the Lower East Side.

    Such a base will get you hammered, and Mousavi got hammered. Fraud or not, Ahmadinejad won and he won significantly. That he won is not the mystery; the mystery is why others thought he wouldn’t win.

    For a time on Friday, it seemed that Mousavi might be able to call for an uprising in Tehran. But the moment passed when Ahmadinejad’s security forces on motorcycles intervened.

    And that leaves the West with its worst-case scenario: a democratically elected anti-liberal.

    Western democracies assume that publics will elect liberals who will protect their rights.

    In reality, it’s a more complicated world. Hitler is the classic example of someone who came to power constitutionally, and then preceded to gut the constitution.

    Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s victory is a triumph of both democracy and repression.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     

    The Road Ahead: More of the Same

    The question now is what will happen next. Internally, we can expect Ahmadinejad to consolidate his position under the cover of anti-corruption.

    He wants to clean up the ayatollahs, many of whom are his enemies. He will need the support of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This election has made Ahmadinejad a powerful president, perhaps the most powerful in Iran since the revolution.

    Ahmadinejad does not want to challenge Khamenei, and we suspect that Khamenei will not want to challenge Ahmadinejad.

    A forced marriage is emerging, one which may place many other religious leaders in a difficult position.

    Certainly, hopes that a new political leadership would cut back on Iran’s nuclear program have been dashed. The champion of that program has won, in part because he championed the program.

    We still see Iran as far from developing a deliverable nuclear weapon, but certainly the Obama administration’s hopes that Ahmadinejad would either be replaced — or at least weakened and forced to be more conciliatory — have been crushed.

    Interestingly, Ahmadinejad sent congratulations to U.S. President Barack Obama on his inauguration. We would expect Obama to reciprocate under his opening policy, which U.S. Vice President Joe Biden appears to have affirmed, assuming he was speaking for Obama.

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    Once the vote fraud issue settles, we will have a better idea of whether Obama’s policies will continue. (We expect they will.)

    What we have now are two presidents in a politically secure position, something that normally forms a basis for negotiations.

    The problem is that it is not clear what the Iranians are prepared to negotiate on, nor is it clear what the Americans are prepared to give the Iranians to induce them to negotiate.

    Iran wants greater influence in Iraq and its role as a regional leader acknowledged, something the United States doesn’t want to give them.

    The United States wants an end to the Iranian nuclear program, which Iran doesn’t want to give.

    On the surface, this would seem to open the door for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Former U.S. President George W. Bush did not — and Obama does not — have any appetite for such an attack.

    Both presidents blocked the Israelis from attacking, assuming the Israelis ever actually wanted to attack. For the moment, the election appears to have frozen the status quo in place.

    Neither the United States nor Iran seem prepared to move significantly, and there are no third parties that want to get involved in the issue beyond the occasional European diplomatic mission or Russian threat to sell something to Iran.

    In the end, this shows what we have long known: This game is locked in place, and goes on.

    Weblinks: http://www.ahmadinejad.ir/

     

    This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com

    Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com