A nudge and a wink get given to Mugabe from CAMEC.
Investigations carried out by Channel 4’s “Dispatches” programme “Bankrolling Mugabe” broadcast in recent days, brought a story to the attention of viewers about how the Zimbabwean Government has controversially maintained business relations with a mining-production company named CAMEC.
Possible corruption charges could be levelled at this company, since its chairman, a certain Mr Philippe Henri Edmonds (businessman and retired cricket player for England and Middlesex from 1974 -1987) has cohorted with the Mugage regime for the purposes of mining platinum.
Another name which the programme brought to light was that of Billy Rautenbach, a well-known white capitalist, who has been connected ZANU-PF and the issue of his upholding of suspect business arrangments in the past.
Mr Rautenbach seems to be the closest and most dependable contact Mugabe has at present.
In fact, the institutionally intermittent brand of denigration the state has gone through over the decade, has probably allowed civil channels to open for corruption and iniquity to spread while Zimbabwe experiences a period of “cold shoulder” treatment from the international community.
Weblinks:
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/episode-guide/series-32/episode-1
http://www.camec-plc.com/countries/zimbabwe.php
http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/2958.html
http://www.ethicalcorporation.com/resources/pdfs/content/20089154339_MEA_Zim%20special.pdf
Examining the Jakarta Attacks: Trends and Challenges – By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton.
On the morning of July 17, a guest at the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta came down to the lobby and began walking toward the lounge with his roll-aboard suitcase in tow and a backpack slung across his chest.
Sensing something odd about the fellow, alert security officers approached him and asked him if he required assistance.
The guest responded that he needed to deliver the backpack to his boss and proceeded to the lounge, accompanied by one of the security guards.
Shortly after entering the lounge, the guest activated the improvised explosive device (IED) contained in the backpack, killing himself and five others.
Minutes later, an accomplice detonated a second IED in a restaurant at the adjacent Ritz-Carlton hotel, killing himself and two other victims, bringing the death toll from the operation to nine — including six foreigners.
The twin bombings in Jakarta underscore two tactical trends that STRATFOR has been following for several years now, namely, the targeting of hotels in terrorist attacks and the use of smaller suicide devices to circumvent physical security measures.
The Jakarta attacks also highlight the challenges associated with protecting soft targets such as hotels against such attacks. Read full article »
Excerpt republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com
Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com
U.S.: Reaction to the CIA Assassination Program – By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
On June 23, 2009, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta learned of a highly compartmentalized program to assassinate al Qaeda operatives that was launched by the CIA in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
When Panetta found out that the covert program had not been disclosed to Congress, he canceled it and then called an emergency meeting June 24 to brief congressional oversight committees on the program.
Over the past week, many details of the program have been leaked to the press and the issue has received extensive media coverage.
That a program existed to assassinate al Qaeda leaders should certainly come as no surprise to anyone.
It has been well-publicized that the Clinton administration had launched military operations and attempted to use covert programs to strike the al Qaeda leadership in the wake of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
In fact, the Clinton administration has come under strong criticism for not doing more to decapitate al Qaeda prior to 2001.
Furthermore, since 2002, the CIA has conducted scores of strikes against al Qaeda targets in Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-1 Predator and the larger MQ-9 Reaper.
These strikes have dramatically increased over the past two years and the pace did not slacken when the Obama administration came to power in January.
So far in 2009 there have been more than two dozen UAV strikes in Pakistan alone. In November 2002, the CIA also employed a UAV to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi, a senior al Qaeda leader suspected of planning the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole.
The U.S. government has also attacked al Qaeda leaders at other times and in other places, such as the May 1, 2008, attack against al Qaeda-linked figures in Somalia using an AC-130 gunship. Read full article »
This article excerpt has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com
Attribution for this full article goes to www.stratfor.com
Weblinks: http://www.theuav.com/
MQ-1 Predator
http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/mq-1%20predator.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4w5wPiy2ms
MQ-9 Reaper.
http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/forums/video-mq-9-reaper-doing-a-touch-and-go-23442.aspx
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSpOYZR0klA
http://www.aviationspectator.com/resources/aircraft-profiles/mq-9-reaper-uas-aircraft-profile
Cheap Talk Costs Upturns.
G8 world leaders, financial experts and social commentators have in recent months and years tried to talk in one complete breath it seems, about the importance of environmental sustainability and overarching economic growth to a public body-politik, which I believe does not reflect either the legal will nor projected airs of most of our national governments.
One thing that has been particularly vexing throughout the time of this downturn, revolves around why has the UK reported so negatively upon it.
Future projections by economic analysts and others in the know estimate that the world will be in a position of recovery from this global recession by eitther 2010-11.
While incidentially, the commencement of the London 2012 Olympic Games happen shortly after our exit out of this downturn.
Undoubtedly the capital investment and development put into every venue within this new Olympic Park will be huge, and the British Government will not want any kind of distasteful remnant of, (i.e bad reminders of recession or credit crunches) effecting people’s interest, enthusiasm, to sight-see and spend during the length of the games.
Weblinks:
https://www.stratfor.com/campaign/video_signup_4
http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/london/index_uk.asp
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech372.pdf
Strategic Calculus and the Afghan War – By George Friedman
U.S. and allied forces began their first major offensive in Afghanistan under the command of U.S. Gen David Petraeus and Gen. Stanley McChrystal this July.
Inevitably, coalition casualties have begun to mount. Fifteen British soldiers have died within the past 10 days — eight of whom were killed within a 24-hour period — in Helmand province, where the operation is taking place. On July 6, seven U.S. soldiers were killed in separate attacks across Afghanistan within a single day, and on July 12 another four U.S. soldiers were reported killed in Helmand.
While the numbers are still relatively low, the reaction, particularly in the United Kingdom, was strong. Afghanistan had long been a war of intermittent casualties, the “other war.” Now it is the prime theater of operations.
The United States has changed the rules of the war, and so a great many things now change. The increase in casualties by itself does not tell us much about the success of the operation.
If U.S. and NATO forces are successful in finding and attacking Taliban militants, Western casualties inevitably will spike.
If the Taliban were prepared for the offensive, and small units were waiting in ambush, coalition casualties also will rise.
Overall, however, the casualties remain low for the number of troops involved — and no matter how well the operation is going, it will result in casualties.
Read full article at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090713_strategic_calculus_and_afghan_war?utm_source=GWeeklyS&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=090713&utm_content=readmore
Weblinks: http://csis.org/publication/air-war-afghanistan-broader-issue
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2003_files/no_2/review/2r.htm
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/asymmetry_4195.jsp
Video: Russia, Poland and U.S. Strategy
In the latest installment of the STRATFOR Insights video series, CEO George Friedman analyzes the upcoming summit July 6-8 between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama from a geopolitical perspective.
Likely topics on the agenda include Iran, Afghanistan, U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and Russia’s sphere of influence.
Video used with permission from Reuters.
To view all video analysis, visit www.STRATFOR.com.
The Gazprom Corp has acquired stupendous prestige since founded in 1998, and yet whilst President Dmitry Medvedev has held a series of consultations with world leaders, he has only convivially managed to establish the settling- in of controversy.
With regard to his government’s nationalization of its gas reserves and agreements to supply both neighbouring and other wider potential trading partners, Medvedev since handed the reigns of power from Vladimir Putin in 2008 has gained a lot of bargaining power.
As conversations about green agendas become more commonplace, and politicians talk more about the importance of gauranteeing our future energy security, the goings-on at well mediatized international conferences, attended by our delegates proceed from phase to phase until breakthrough are made.
Weblinks:
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x89rt3_spotlightgazprom-direct-speech_news
http://old.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article8511.shtml
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/gazprom/index.html
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b05795e-4733-11de-923e-00144feabdc0.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8118721.stm
| The contributing two paragraphs added to this post have been by me (jotl). But in the main all attribution for this post goes to www.stratfor.com | |
EA:The Return of Classical Greek Terrorism – By Fred Burton and Ben West
Greek anti-terrorism police officer Nektarios Savas was shot and killed June 17 while guarding a state witness in an Athens neighborhood.
Savas was parked in an unmarked vehicle outside the residence of Sofia Kyriakidou, the wife and key witness in the trial of Angeletos Kanas, a convicted member of a defunct Greek militant group.
At 6:20 a.m., shortly after sunrise in Athens, Savas had just gotten coffee and was settling in for his shift when two gunmen approached his vehicle and fired 24 rounds into it, hitting him 18 times and wounding him fatally.
The assassins then sped away on motorcycles driven by two other accomplices. Savas was never able to draw his weapon.
Although the witness Savas was protecting was in the house at the time of the shooting, the gunmen do not appear to have made any attempt to harm her.
Two groups claimed responsibility for the murder, “Revolutionary Sect” and “Rebel Sect,” but groups using slight variations of these names have claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks so far this year.
It is very common for militant groups to claim responsibility for attacks using different names to confuse their pursuers. We believe the group behind most of the recent attacks is “Revolutionary Struggle” (EA).
EA (its initials in Greek) is thought to be a spinoff from the Greek terrorist group November 17 (N-17) and has been operational since at least October 2003.
It shares a similar ideology with N-17, which rejected democracy, capitalism and outside influence in Greece — especially from the United States.
EA rejects EU policies in Greece that it claims hurt the working class. EA was very vocal in the run-up to the 2004 Olympics in Athens, carrying out attacks against businesses and the police to protest the high levels of security in the country and the high price tag that came with hosting the games.
The murder of Savas and other recent attacks by EA demonstrate that the group is becoming increasingly brazen and aggressive, and comparisons between EA and N-17 reach beyond ideology.
EA has used tactics and attacked a target set very much like those of N-17.
It is quite possible, then, that we will see EA expand its actions to include attacks similar to those carried out by N-17, which, throughout its long operational history, assassinated not only police officers but also diplomats and industrialists by using small arms at close range.
Terrorism in Greece
Periodic attacks by anarchists and left-wing militant groups in Greece date back to 1975, when the emerging N-17 shot and killed CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in Athens.
In 2009, however, militant attacks have become more frequent and lethal. There have been 16 attacks so far in 2009, compared to 10 in 2008 and 4 in 2007, and Savas was the first casualty linked to EA or similar groups since 2004. He was not the first police officer to have been targeted in recent years.
On Jan. 5, 2009, during protests in Athens following the police shooting of a 15-year-old boy in December 2008, gunmen shot and seriously wounded a policeman standing watch outside the Culture Ministry building (EA claimed responsibility).
Then on February 3, three gunmen on motorcycles fired on and threw grenades at a police station in an Athens suburb (claimed the next day by a group calling itself the “Sect of Revolutionaries”).
And in December 2004, a policeman was shot and killed while guarding a British diplomat by a man believed to be linked to EA.
In its early stages, EA typically avoided lethal attacks. The group would place warning calls before detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) and conduct attacks at night when the chances of collateral damage were lower.
Their attacks were more the acts of vandals than terrorists. However, in recent years EA has increased its level of violence and has staged attacks that are clearly intended to kill.
Due to this escalation, EA has begun to look more like N-17, and its recent attacks appear to be borrowing from N-17’s playbook.
Shared Tactics
N-17 was comprised of a small group of dedicated militants who, over a period of 25 years in the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s, were responsible for assassinating 22 people before being taken down by Greek authorities in June 2002 (the break came when an N-17 member was wounded while attempting to plant an IED).
N-17 targeted Greek political offices, police and military installations and vehicles, tax offices and facilities of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs).
For targeted assassinations, it employed simple attacks with firearms — a single .45-caliber automatic pistol was linked by ballistics to five different attacks over a 20-year period.
But N-17 also used anti-tank rockets (acquired in a raid on an army camp in 1989) and IEDs, which were involved in its attack against the U.S. Embassy in Athens in 1996 and in its 1988 assassination of U.S. Navy Capt. William Nordeen.
But N-17’s most lethal tactic was the small-arms attack against foreign diplomats and Greek businessmen as they were entering or exiting their vehicles or as they were stopped in traffic.
Its first attack, against Welch, the CIA station chief, occurred outside his home as he was coming back from a Christmas party.
In 1983, the head of the U.S. military aid group in Greece, Navy Capt. George Tsantes, was shot and killed while in his vehicle at a traffic light.
Greek industrialist Dimitris Angelopoulos was shot outside his home as he was entering his vehicle in April 1986.
A number of other cases followed the same script, all the way through to 2000, when British defense attache Brig. Stephen Saunders was shot and killed on his morning commute to the British Embassy by two gunmen on a motorcycle, a get-away vehicle that appears to be as popular with EA as it was with N-17.
It is telling that when EA decided to kill officer Savas it opted for the same tactics as its predecessor used: gunmen on motorcycles striking vehicle-borne targets who were following routine schedules.
Such attacks adhere to a tried-and-true formula that, while not as dramatic as IEDs and rocket attacks, is very straightforward and embodies a simple, brutal elegance.
Shared Target Set
EA appears to have adopted N-17’s target set as well as its tactics. EA and related groups routinely target foreign MNC facilities such as car dealerships and banks, along with security installations and political offices (such as those of Greece’s leading party, New Democracy, attacked in July 2007).
But EA also has a taste, as did N-17, for going after foreign diplomatic targets. In January 2007, EA fired an anti-tank rocket at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, damaging an outside wall.
In 2007 and 2008, militants possibly linked to EA detonated a series of improvised incendiary devices made with camping gas canisters under vehicles belonging to Saudi, Turkish, Philippine Italian and Bosnian diplomats.
The attacks typically destroyed the cars but caused no physical harm to anyone.
While targeting parked diplomatic vehicles with improvised incendiary devices at night posed a minimal threat to people, it did demonstrate that the perpetrators possessed skills that could be employed to more lethal effect.
Even low-level attacks like those on the diplomatic cars showed that militants could follow the basic terrorism attack cycle and conduct preoperational surveillance to determine where the cars were parked at night.
Then they were able to plan their attacks, acquire the necessary materials, construct their devices and plant them without detection.
And if an attacker can determine where a diplomat parks his or her car at night and plan an operation around that, it is not a very large leap to shoot a diplomat walking to a car or sitting inside a car in traffic.
Of course, simply identifying a vehicle with diplomatic plates does not automatically mean that the owner is a high-level diplomat.
In order to identify a high-value target (HVT) such as a CIA station chief or military attache, additional intelligence would have to be collected.
To justify its increasing aggressiveness, EA has used accusations of police brutality stemming from the December 2008 shooting of a youth, but another underlying factor that has led to public unrest in Greece is the global economic crisis, which in Europe is widely blamed on foreign companies and governments.
EA and like-minded groups have made it clear that international banks and investment houses are in their crosshairs, as seen in the attempted Feb. 18 IED attack on a Citibank branch in Athens and a successful attack on a Citibank branch the next month.
Just as the attack against the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic vehicles demonstrated that foreign diplomats are in EA’s target set, these bank attacks demonstrate that financial executives also could be targeted.
Protecting Against the Threat
No government has the resources to protect everything, and the Greek government is no exception.
EA has many targets, which means that Athens cannot possibly protect every foreign diplomat, Greek industrialist and foreign businessman in the country. Because of this, individuals in this target set must begin to practice good personal security habits and increased situational awareness.
Special attention should be paid to possible surveillants on motorcycles (especially those wearing helmets that obscure the entire face). N-17 shot several victims from motorcycles as the victims were sitting in their cars in Athens traffic.
Assailants would pull up from behind the driver’s window and fire from close range. Potential EA targets should pay close attention to motorcycles approaching them from the rear as they are stopped in traffic.
Likewise, companies and governments with people on the ground in Greece should conduct their own proactive security measures to prevent falling victim to an attack.
One of the most obvious measures is to institute a countersurveillance (CS) program, since any attack would be preceded by preoperational surveillance of the target.
Employing a countersurveillance team will help identify potential surveillants around sensitive targets (such as private residences, offices or commonly used routes) and increase the likelihood of thwarting an attack while it is still in the planning stage.
(Such efforts might also produce information that would help the Greek government identify EA operatives.)
However, even if a CS operation is not successful at identifying specific operatives, it could, at the very least, make it harder for militants to attack a certain target and encourage them to move on to something less challenging.
With attacks escalating in Greece, a militant group apparently taking its cues from N-17, and an economic crisis stirring up social unrest, the level of risk in Greece — especially Athens — is very high.
Practicing appropriate security measures will help ensure the safety of HVTs and prevent them from becoming the next media story.
Postscript for Security Pros
The June 17 Savas killing holds a strong lesson for anyone working alone to protect a potential target.
This is not as uncommon as it might seem: There are many executive protection teams around the world in both government and private industry that rely on a single officer or agent working to keep a principal safe.
And it is not at all uncommon for a lone agent, like Savas, to work long hours posted in front of the principal’s home.
During such an operation, it is extremely difficult to remain alert — especially after standing a post for weeks or months without anything happening.
It becomes a full-time job merely to remain alert during an entire shift and it is very easy for complacency to set in.
This danger is amplified in the age of iPhones, PDAs and laptop computers, devices that make it very easy to become distracted.
But lack of situational awareness can be very deadly, even for trained security personnel.
Weblinks: http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Greek_extremists_claim_policeman_s__06222009.html
http://www.france24.com/en/20090617-greek-witness-protection-officer-killed-athens-0
http://www.assassinology.org/id23.html
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100002_14/01/2003_25198
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=Countries&file=index&view=95
This article has been republished by www.jotl.wordpress.com
Attribution for this article goes to www.stratfor.com
